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Pari Passu as a Weapon and the Changes to
Sovereign Debt Boilerplate after Argentina
v. NML
David Newfield*
The pari passu clause is found in nearly every sovereign debt
contract issued throughout the globe. In the private context, this
clause is well understood to ensure fair distributions to all
creditors in the event of bankruptcy and liquidation. As
insolvency distributions are not an option when dealing with
distressed sovereign debt, the rights and duties associated with
this clause have been subject to extensive litigation for over 20
years.
Starting from the case of Elliot v. Peru, in the early 1990s, and
more recently in Argentina v. NML, courts have interpreting
these bonds, governed subject to New York law, in favor of
holdout creditors. By means of a novel interpretation of the
clause, vulture funds have gained a legal “weapon” with which
they can force a sovereign nation into default if they are not paid
in full. As a result, sovereign debtors have rapidly begun to
adapt the pari passu clause in their new debt contracts to negate
the adverse position of the courts. This leads to the questions of
why these contracts have been so slow to adapt and what
catalyst has been the impetus of change in recent years.
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I. INTRODUCTION
What happens when a country can no longer meet its debt
obligations? For individuals, corporations, and municipalities, when a
person or entity cannot repay its debts, bankruptcy may be the next step.1
Bankruptcy allows the debtor either to liquidate, by surrendering its
assets to creditors, or to restructure the debt.2 Even if an individual does
not file for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy laws governing liquidation and
reorganization will provide the legal backdrop against which an out-ofcourt workout may be reached.3 Creditors who might otherwise oppose a
debt restructuring may ultimately consent, knowing that a court could
force a restructuring over their objections.4 For a sovereign, however,
there is no bankruptcy option.5 There are no procedures for liquidating a
1

See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2014).
UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/Bank
ruptcyBasics/Process.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2015); see also 11 U.S.C. (2010).
Chapter 7 provides for liquidation of debtor’s assets. Id. Chapter 9 provides for municipal
reorganization. Id. Chapter 11 provides for commercial reorganization. Id. Chapter 13
provides for adjustment of debts to meet a payment plan for a debtor with regular income.
Id.
3
See Richard M. Cieri et al., Restructuring bond debt in the global marketplace,
GIBSON DUNN (2004/05), http://www.gibsondunn.com/fstore/documents/pubs/Restructuri
ng_Bond_Debt.pdf, at 33-34.
4
Id. at 38-39.
5
See Nouriel Roubini, Gouging the Gauchos, KITCO (Jul. 01, 2014, 12:18 PM),
http://www.kitco.com/ind/Roubini/2014-07-01-Gouging-the-Gauchos.html?sitetype=fulls
ite#.U7PcQuFRKrg.email [hereinafter Roubini]. In 2002, the IMF proposed a framework
for a sovereign bankruptcy court. However, this proposal has been widely considered
2
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sovereign, and there is no background set of legal rules under which a
court may “cram down” a debt restructuring.6
Without a bankruptcy option, sovereign debt restructuring is
vulnerable to holdout problems: a minority of creditors may oppose the
terms of a restructuring in order to extract a greater dividend from the
sovereign.7 In order to aid the process of sovereign debt workouts and the
restructuring of debt, “boilerplate”8 language has developed in sovereign
debt contracts.9 While boilerplate language in these contracts serves the
general function of standard terms, such as to create a consistent
framework familiar to all market participants, certain clauses have been
developed specifically to address the holdout problem.10
An example of such a boilerplate provision is the collective action
clause (“CAC”).11 The market has gradually shifted from unanimous
action clauses (“UACs”), which require unanimous creditor approval for
debtors to amend bond terms, to CACs, which only require a majority,
usually a supermajority,12 of the other creditors to have accepted the
debt’s new terms.13 Thus, CACs allow debtors to “cram down on
holdouts . . . terms accepted by a majority of creditors.”14
Another notable boilerplate clause found in sovereign debt contracts
is known as the “pari passu” clause. Pari passu literally means “on equal

politically infeasible. See Jefferey A. Frankel, Comment on “Toward a Statutory
Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Lessons from Corporate Bankruptcy Practice
Around the World”, IMF (2003), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/2002/0000/pdf/Frankel.pdf, at 78.
6
See Roubini, supra note 5.
7
See id.
8
Boilerplate is “[f]ixed or standardized contractual language that the proposing party
often views as relatively nonnegotiable.” BOILERPLATE, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014).
9
See Roubini, supra note 5.
10
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An
Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 930-32 (2004); see also
Roubini, supra note 5.
11
See Roubini, supra note 5.
12
Supermajority is “[a] fixed proportion greater than half (often two-thirds or a
percentage greater than 50%), required for a measure to pass. Such a majority is needed
for certain extraordinary actions, such as ratifying a constitutional amendment or
approving a fundamental corporate change.” MAJORITY, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014).
13
See Stephen J. Choi et al., The Dynamics of Contract Evolution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1, 13-15 (2013).
14
Roubini, supra note 5. Note that even CACs are not a perfect way to avoid a holdout
problem in the future. A cramdown is a concept in bankruptcy law where “despite the
opposition of certain creditors . . . .a court may confirm a [bankruptcy] plan.”
CRAMDOWN, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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footing.”15 The purpose of this clause is to obligate the debtor to treat all
creditors fairly by not favoring one creditor through the subordination of
another creditor’s debt.16 In the corporate context, this means “those
whose debts rank pari passu will get paid on an equal priority in the
event of an insolvency distribution.”17 However, as sovereign nations
cannot be liquidated, the actual meaning of the pari passu clause in the
sovereign debt context has been subject to much dispute.18 Originally,
this clause was thought to protect only the legal “ranking” of a sovereign
creditor’s claims.19 However, an interpretation requiring “ratable
payment” to creditors appeared with the introduction of litigation on the
issue.20
The first major case that addressed the clause was Elliott v. Peru, a
case interpreting the meaning of pari passu as governed by New York
law.21 Elliott Associates L.P., a vulture fund,22 purchased a large amount
15

Mark L.J. Wright, Interpreting the Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Bond Contracts:
It’s all Hebrew (and Aramaic) to Me, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO (May 4,
2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=24326711, at 1.
16
Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt
Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869, 911-12 (2004).
17
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129,
1134 (2006).
18
See id. at 1133-34.
19
Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action Problems in
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, IMF (Oct. 2014), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2
014/090214.pdf at 38 [hereinafter IMF]. This is known as the “ranking” interpretation.
A sovereign could affect the legal ranking of such creditor claims . . .
by (i) earmarking government revenues or by allocating foreign
currency reserves to a single creditor, (ii) adopting legal measures
that would have the effect of preferring one set of creditors over
others, or (iii) allowing creditors to obtain priority without the
consent of other creditors.
Id.
20
Id. This is known as the “ratable payment” interpretation. Id. Under this broader
“ratable payment” interpretation, the clause not only protected legal rank, but also
included a payment obligation that required the sovereign to pay its creditors on a ratable
basis. While this interpretation would not preclude a sovereign from contracting debts
with different repayment profiles, the implication was that if the sovereign were unable to
pay all of its debts in full as they became due and payable, it would need to pay such
debts on a ratable basis.
21
See Choi, supra note 17 at 1134; see also Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Banco de la
Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 366 (2d Cir. 1999).
22
A “vulture fund” is a hedge fund or private equity fund that invests in debt that is
considered weak and/or in imminent default (otherwise known as “distressed debt”).
“These plaintiffs are often referred to as ‘vulture funds’ because their strategy is to buy
sovereign debt instruments when a country is most vulnerable, which enables the funds to
purchase the debt at a deep discount from its face value and attempt to enforce the full
claims.” Jonathan I. Blackman & Rahul Mukhi, The Evolution of Modern Sovereign Debt
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of distressed Peruvian bank debt, which was guaranteed by Peru’s
government.23 Elliott refused to participate in the restructuring process
when the government of Peru could no longer meet its debt obligations,
and the fund demanded full repayment of its debt.24 Despite Elliot’s
demands, Peru decided to proceed with repaying its creditors that had
accepted its new repayment plan.25 Elliott responded by trying to enjoin
European payment processers from assisting Peru by arguing that the
pari passu clause prevents debtors from making payments to only some
creditors at the exclusion of others—the ratable payment interpretation.26
This case went before the Belgian Court of Appeals, which sided with
Elliott’s position.27 Before the case proceeded to further litigation, the
parties settled out of court.28
A more recent case that addressed the meaning of the pari passu
clause in the sovereign debt context is Argentina v. NML.29 NML
Capital,30 also a vulture fund, acquired a small percentage of Argentina’s
distressed debt, which was governed by New York law.31 Later, when
Argentina tried to repay its creditors that accepted its restructured debt,
NML obtained injunctive relief in the Second Circuit prohibiting
Argentina from repaying 93% of its distressed debt to renegotiated
bondholders without repaying the remaining 7% to holdout investors
simultaneously.32 The Court’s adoption of the ratable payment
interpretation forced Argentina to default on its restructured bonds and
effectively gave a hedge fund the power to control a country’s ability to
repay its debts, by preventing the country from repaying its renegotiated
bondholders until the holdout creditors’ debts were satisfied.33

Litigation: Vultures, Alter Egos, and Other Legal Fauna, 73 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS 47, 49 (Fall 2010), http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol73/iss4/6/.
23
Umakanth Varottil, Sovereign Debt Documentation: Unraveling the Pari Passu
Mystery, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 119, 120 (2008).
24
See id.
25
See id. at 121.
26
See id. at 121-22.
27
Id. at 122.
28
Id.
29
See IMF, supra note 19, at 40-41.
30
It is interesting to note that NML Capital, the plaintiff in the Argentina litigation, is
a subsidiary of Elliott Associates, the plaintiff in the Peru litigation. See Africa and Latin
America Still Fight Vulture Funds, THE WORLD POST (Nov. 12, 2012, 2:46 PM), http://w
ww.huffingtonpost.com/hector-timerman/africa-latin-america-vulture-funds_b_2100827.
html.
31
See IMF, supra note 19, at 8.
32
Id. at 8-9.
33
See Roubini, Supra note 5; see also Jamila Trindle, Argentine Default Bad Test Case
for Sovereign Debt Negotiations, FOREIGN POLICY (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.foreignpo
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As a reaction to the recent Argentina decision,34 there has been a
sudden urgency to avoid a similar holdout investor problem in the future
by rewording the boilerplate language in sovereign debt contracts.35 Both
the International Capital Markets Association (“ICMA”) and the
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) have been very involved with
reworking these contracts.36 Besides making changes to the pari passu
clause, the CACs for new bond contracts have also been reworked.37
The sudden urgency to change the boilerplate language of sovereign
debt contracts begs the question: why did the boilerplate language not
change after Elliott v. Peru in contrast to the rapid change now taking
place after Argentina v. NML? Phrased differently, boilerplate language
is known to be “sticky” and is not changed very often.38 By using
standardized terms, contracting parties are able to lower uncertainty
levels and reduce contracting costs.39 What then changed that is leading
to this language being modified so quickly now?
This Comment argues that after Argentina, the pari passu clause
became a “weapon” that holdout investors could use. Unlike after Peru,
holdout investors such as hedge funds, are empowered to, and have,
forced a sovereign nation to default on its debt after Argentina. In Peru,
the danger of the Belgian Court’s interpretation of the pari passu clause
was recognized, but no harm ultimately arose and the decision was
considered a one-off occurrence. The nature of the Second Circuit’s
Argentina ruling and the subsequent Argentina default is so extreme that
it has dictated a market response that differs in severity and speed from
Peru. Also, unlike the typical slow adoption of new boilerplate terms by
market participants, a much quicker and broader large-scale adoption
may be expected.

licy.com/articles/2014/08/25/argentina_default_bond_vulture_hedge_fund_sovereign_de
bt_grenada.
34

The Second Circuit issued its decision in October 2012. However, its decision was
not final until the Supreme Court refused to hear Argentina’s appeal in June 2014. See
infra p. 16.
35
See, e.g., Anna Gelpern, A Sensible Step to Mitigate Sovereign Bond Dysfunction,
PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (Aug. 29, 2014, 4:57 PM),
http://blogs.piie.com/realtime/?p=4485; see also IMF, supra note 19, at 8-9.After the
Supreme Court decision came out in June 2014, ICMA and the IMF published proposed
amendments to the clauses within months—August and October respectively. Id.
36
See Gelpern, supra note 35; see IMF, supra note 19.
37
See generally IMF, supra note 19, at 15-30.
38
Gregory H. Shill, Boilerplate Shock: Sovereign Debt Contracts as Incubators of
Systemic Risk, 89 TUL. L. REV. 751, 765 (2015).
39
Choi, supra note 10, at 931.
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Part II of this Comment describes the nature of sovereign debt
boilerplate contracts and narrates events, both during and following
Elliot v. Peru and Argentina v. NML. Parts III and IV of this Comment
then explain the reasons for the differing market responses, describe
what type of further litigation of the pari passu clause may arise, and
briefly examine what to expect should the interpretation of the pari passu
clause be challenged as a matter of English law.

II. BACKGROUND
A. The Nature of Sovereign Debt Boilerplate
Two types of provisions in sovereign debt contracts are particularly
important as to the holdout creditor problem—the pari passu clause and
the collective action clause (“CAC”). The pari passu clause has existed
as boilerplate language in sovereign debt contracts for nearly two
centuries.40 This clause arguably empowers creditors by preventing
debtors from subordinating one creditor’s claim to another creditor’s
claim.41 CACs are a more recent development designed specifically to
address the holdout problem by empowering the debtor.42 After bonds
are issued, parties require a way to restructure debt outside of a
bankruptcy court.43 Thus, unanimous action clauses (“UACs”) and CACs
were included in bond contracts to allow parties to amend terms of the
bond issue.44 UACs require unanimous bondholder approval in order to
modify principal and interest terms of the contract.45 In contrast, CACs
serve a similar purpose, but do not require unanimous approval, making
it easier to reduce the payment terms in sovereign bonds.46 With no other
way to “cram down” new terms on holdouts of sovereign debt contracts,
as bankruptcy is not an option, CACs are increasingly employed.47
Much research on sovereign debt boilerplate has focused on the shift
from UACs to CACs in sovereign bonds.48 The shift to CACs began in
late 2000, when Ecuador used a creative interpretation of a UAC clause
40

Benjamin Remy Chabot & Mitu Gulati, Santa Anna and His Black Eagle: The
Origins of Pari Passu?, 9 CAPITAL MARKETS LAW JOURNAL 1, 1 (Feb. 18, 2014), http://sc
holarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3237/.
41
See Choi, supra note 17, at 1133-36.
42
Roubini, supra note 5.
43
See Choi, supra note 10, at 932.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
See id.
47
Roubini, supra note 5.
48
See Choi, supra note 10, at 932.
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to modify existing bond terms with less than unanimous approval from
bondholders.49 Ecuador structured an exchange offer where bondholders
who participated in the exchange automatically voted in favor of a list of
amendments to the old bonds; thus, making those bonds less attractive to
holdout investors.50 This restructuring method effectively reduced
incentives for holdout investors to refrain from participating in the bond
exchange in the hope that they would be able to negotiate for better terms
at a later date.51 However, it took three years for the market to shift away
from existing UAC terms and to begin using modified CACs—only after
Mexico took the first step by redrafting its consent clauses.52
Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati, two of the preeminent scholars on the
nature of boilerplate language in sovereign debt contracts, attributed the
lack of an immediate shift to new contract terms to the “stickiness
hypothesis.”53 The standardized nature of sovereign debt contracts has
been attributed to network externalities.54 No meaningful regulatory body
exists that interferes with the contracting practices of such contracts.55
Further, such contracts involve hundreds of millions of dollars and are
often traded in the secondary market.56 Thus, adopting standardized
terms in these contracts helps lower uncertainty levels and reduces
49

Choi, supra note 10, at 933; see also Policy Development and Review and Legal
Departments, Involving the Private Sector in the Resolution of Financial Crises—
Restructuring Internationals Sovereign Bonds, IMF (Jan. 24, 2001), http://www.imf.org/e
xternal/pubs/ft/series/03/IPS.pdf at 7 [hereinafter IMF, Policy Development].
50

IMF, Policy Development, supra note 49, at 8. The amendment deleted:
the requirement that all payment defaults must be cured as a
condition to any rescission of acceleration, the provision that restricts
Ecuador from purchasing any of the Brady bonds while a payment
default is continuing, the covenant that prohibits Ecuador from
seeking a further restructuring of Brady bonds, the cross-default
clause, the negative pledge covenant, and the covenant to maintain
the listing of the defaulted instruments on the Luxembourg Stock
Exchange.

Id.
51

Id.
See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 681 (2006).
53
Id.
54
Choi, supra note 10, at 930-31. The discussion of network externalities originated in
economic theory. Bryan Druzin, Buying Commercial Law: Choice of Law, Choice of
Forum, and Network Externalities, 18 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 131, 145 (2009). “[T]he
notion of network externalities . . . has been put forward as a way of explaining the
ascendancy of particular products over others.” Id. “Positive feedback mechanisms . . .
reinforce bourgeoning patterns in a particular field, causing these patterns to become
progressively more entrenched.” Id. at 146.
55
Choi, supra note 10, at 930.
56
Id.
52
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contracting costs.57 A change in sovereign debt contracts only occurs
when there is an “interpretive shock.”58 This change is typically not
immediate, and will usually only take place in small shifts.59 Debtors
avoid making a large shift due to the uncertainty that the new contract
terms are any better, and will usually wait for these deviance costs to be
borne by a “pioneer.”60

B. Litigation Involving Pari Passu—Two Interpretations
Recently, much litigation of sovereign debt boilerplate has focused
on the pari passu clause.61 Numerous scholars have posited various
theories as to why this clause was first introduced.62 Despite the fact that
the clause has been found in nearly every single sovereign debt contract
since its introduction, there is no one accepted understanding as to its
meaning.63
A typical pari passu clause is worded as such: “The Notes rank, and
will rank, pari passu in right of payment with all other present and future
unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness of the Issuer.”64
Pari passu roughly translates to “on equal footing.”65 In the case of
corporate bonds, commentators have widely agreed on the meaning of
this clause: that in the event of insolvency and liquidation, all holders of
equally ranked debt will receive an equal share of the proceeds.66
However, in the sovereign debt context, there is no option of liquidation

57

Id. at 931.
See Choi, supra note 10, at 946.
59
See id. at 945-46.
60
Id.; Ben-Shahar, supra note 52, at 681.
61
IMF, supra note 19, at 38.
62
See, e.g., Buchheit, supra note 16, at 875.
These explanations have ranged from a suggestion that drafters may
have wanted to prevent an informal ‘earmarking’ of a sovereign’s
assets or revenues to service a particular debt to the more cynical
explanation that this type of debt had a tendency to migrate—through
the ignorance or inattention of contract drafters—from cross-border
corporate debt instruments to sovereign debt instruments.
Id.; see also Chabot, supra note 40, at 2 (“Santa Anna and his Equal Treatment Decree”);
see also Wright, supra note 15; see also Mark C. Weidemaier et al., Origins Myths,
Contracts, and the Hunt for Pari Passu, 38 Law and Soc. Inquiry 72 (Mar. 25, 2011),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1633439.
63
See Chabot, supra note 40, at 2.
64
Buchheit, supra note 16, at 871 (emphasis added).
65
Wright, supra note 14, at 1.
66
Weidemaier, supra note 52, at 4; see also Choi, supra note 17, at 1134.
58
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in the event of insolvency.67 Thus, the actual legal implications of this
clause under such circumstances are not clearly understood.68

1. Elliott V. Peru
“Until the late 1990s, the prevailing view was that the typical pari
passu clause in sovereign debt agreements protected only the legal
ranking of a sovereign’s creditors.”69 Before then, this clause was
thought to prevent the subordination of one creditor’s debt to another
without the other creditor’s consent.70 For example, in some countries,
such as Spain and the Philippines, the act of notarizing a debt renders it
senior to other debts that have not been notarized.71 Thus, the pari passu
clause prevented such involuntary subordination and provided security to
creditors in cross-border transactions.72
However, “in the late 1990s, an alternative interpretation of the pari
passu clause as requiring ‘ratable payment’ to creditors surfaced in
litigation against sovereign debtors.”73 This new interpretation of pari
passu was introduced in a case brought by the investment fund Elliott
Associates, L.P.74
Between January and March 1996, Elliott purchased approximately
$20.7 million of working capital debt of Banco de la Nacion and Banco
Popular del Peru, a bankrupt Peruvian bank.75 “[A]ll of the debt was
guaranteed by Peru pursuant to a written guaranty dated May 31, 1983,”
which was governed by New York law.76 Despite Peru’s attempts to
restructure this debt, Elliott refused to participate in the restructuring
process.77 Elliott pursued and obtained judgment in the Southern District
of New York for over $55 million.78 Despite its win, Elliott faced the
difficulty of actually collecting the judgment.79 Peru decided to repay the

67
68
69
70

Weidemaier, supra note 52, at 4.
Id.
IMF, supra note 19, at 38.

Id.
Id. at 37 n. 2.
72
See id. at 37.
73
Id. at 38.
74
ISSUE 79—PARI PASSU CLAUSES, 79 FINANCIAL MARKETS LAW COMMITTEE 1, 8
(Mar. 2005), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/files/2012/11/fmlc79mar_2005.pdf [hereinafter
FMLC].
75
Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 366-67 (2d Cir. 1999).
76
Id. at 367.
77
Varottil, supra note 23, at 120.
78
Id. at 120-21.
79
Id. at 121.
71
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holders of its restructured Brady Bonds,80 by using the Euroclear System
in Belgium, and to avoid the payment due to Elliott.81 In September
2000, Elliott attempted to enforce its judgment by seeking an injunction
in the Belgian Courts to prevent Euroclear from processing Peru’s
payment.82
In an affidavit obtained by Elliott for the purpose of the Peru
litigation, New York University Professor Andreas Lowenfeld explained
the pari passu clause as such:
I have no difficulty in understanding what the pari passu
clause means: it means what it says—a given debt will
rank equally with other debt of the borrower, whether
that borrower is an individual, a company, or a sovereign
state. A borrower from Tom, Dick, and Harry can’t say
“I will pay Tom and Dick in full, and if there is anything
left over I’ll pay Harry.” If there is not enough money to
go around, the borrower faced with a pari passu
provision must pay all three of them on the same basis.
Suppose, for example, the total debt is $50,000 and the
borrower has only $30,000 available. Tom lent $20,000
and Dick and Harry lent $15,000 each. The borrower
must pay three fifths of the amount owed to each one –
i.e., $12,000 to Tom, and $9,000 each to Dick and
Harry. Of course the remaining sums would remain as
obligations of the borrower. But if the borrower
proposed to pay Tom $20,000 in full satisfaction, Dick
$10,000 and Harry nothing, a court could and should
issue an injunction at the behest of Harry. The injunction
would run in the first instance against the borrower, but I
believe (putting jurisdictional considerations aside) to
Tom and Dick as well.83

80

Brady Bonds are named after former U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady. These
bonds were introduced in the late 1980s to address the Latin Debt Crisis, when a number
of Latin American countries admitted their inability to service hundreds of billions of
dollars worth of commercial bank loans. In exchange for the commercial bank loans, the
countries issued new bonds with more agreeable repayment terms. This plan was largely
successful. See The Brady Plan, EMTA, http://www.emta.org/template.aspx?id=35&term
s=brady+plan (last visited Feb. 12, 2015).
81
IMF, supra note 19, at 38-39.
82
Id.
83
Buchheit, supra note 16, at 878. This affidavit was a key element of Peru’s case. See
id.
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The Belgian Court of Appeals accepted this interpretation of pari
passu and held that a sovereign debtor cannot make payments to one
creditor to the exclusion of other creditors.84 The Belgian Court’s
decision prevented Peru from paying the holders of its restructured debt,
and Peru subsequently settled with Elliott.85

2. After Peru
It is important to note that after the Belgian Court’s decision in the
Peru case, the language of the pari passu clause in sovereign debt
contracts did not change.86 In an attempt to understand this lack of
market response, Choi and Gulati conducted “over fifty in-depth
interviews with market participants” to try and discern the reason for this
lack of response.87 The most meaningful reason that Choi and Gulati
could identify was “that it was impossible for standard-form clauses that
were present in every single sovereign debt instrument across the globe
to change every time there was an aberrant court decision.”88
Instead of focusing on contractual language, the market did
eventually produce a coordinated response to Peru in a different form.89
In 2003, the sovereign debt community organized itself around a general
litigation strategy and attempted to protect the “ranking” interpretation of
the pari passu clause when the issue surfaced in U.S. courts.90 The
contested interpretation of the pari passu clause appeared in a New York
court in a case regarding the restructuring of Argentina’s sovereign
debt.91

3. Argentina V. NML
In 2001, Argentina defaulted on its Fiscal Agency Agreement Bonds
(“FAA Bonds”),92 which were originally issued in 1994, and “declared a
84
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‘temporary moratorium’ on principal and interest payments . . . .”93
These bonds contained what the court called an “Equal Treatment
Provision”—namely, the pari passu clause.94 Following its default, in
2005, Argentina offered to exchange the FAA Bonds for new bonds with
different terms.95 Subsequently, Argentina renewed the moratorium,
which halted all payments on the FAA Bonds.96 In 2010, Argentina again
renewed its offer to exchange the bonds.97
The plaintiffs in the case, NML Capital, owned defaulted FAA
bonds.98 NML sued Argentina, alleging breach of contract under the pari
passu clause, and sought injunctive relief for specific performance of the
Equal Treatment Provision.99 “In February 2012, the district court
granted injunctive relief, ordering Argentina to specifically perform its
obligations under the Equal Treatment Provision . . . .”100 On appeal, in
October 2012, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision
granting summary judgment to NML Capital on their claim for breach of
the pari passu clause, and ordered Argentina to make “ratable payments”
to all holders of its debt.101 Yet, the Second Circuit stayed the injunctive
relief until the Supreme Court heard Argentina’s appeal.102 In June 2014,
the Supreme Court refused to hear Argentina’s appeal, and the Second
Circuit lifted the prior stay on the injunctions.103 Thus, Argentina found
itself unable to pay its creditors holding restructured bonds without
paying its holdout investors in full under the Second Circuit’s ratable
payment order.104
Following the Supreme Court’s decision, Argentina failed to make a
$539 million payment that was due on its debts by July 2014.105 This
move led ratings-agency-Fitch to declare Argentina’s sovereign debt in
“restricted default.”106
93
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Effectively, the collective decisions of the U.S. courts gave a hedge
fund the power to force a sovereign nation to default on its debts—a
power that was actually used. Accordingly, there is no longer any
incentive for creditors, in future sovereign debt out-of-court workouts, to
accept reduced terms when they have the legal means to insist on
payment in full.107

4. After Argentina
In response to the Second Circuit’s and Supreme Court’s decisions in
Argentina v. NML, there has been a sudden urgency for contract reform
in the area of sovereign debt.108 “On August 29, 2014, the International
Capital Market Association (ICMA) released a new set of model clauses
for sovereign bond contracts to address some of these flaws.”109 ICMA
has proposed clarifying and standardizing the pari passu clause to
prevent courts from ordering debtors to pay holdout investors whenever
the debtors are paying holders of restructured debt.110
In addition, the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) has published
a policy paper examining potential areas of reform in the contractual
framework of sovereign bonds, which particularly addresses the need to
modify the pari passu clause.111 The IMF has explained that the new
model clauses “make explicit that, while it requires equal ranking of all
unsubordinated external indebtedness, it does not require that such
indebtedness be paid on an equal or ratable basis.”112
Changes to the boilerplate terms in sovereign debt contracts have not
been limited to theoretical discussions alone.113 Peru, Mexico,
Kazakhstan, and Vietnam have all filed registration statements with the
formal winding-up procedure, and which has not otherwise ceased operating.” Definitions
of Ratings and Other Forms of Opinion, FITCH RATINGS (Dec. 2014), https://www.fitchrat
ings.com/web_content/ratings/fitch_ratings_definitions_and_scales.pdf, at 34.
107
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See, e.g., Roubini, supra note 5; see also Gelpern, supra note 35; see also IMF,
supra note 19; see also Anna Gelpern, ICMA CACs v. 2.0: Mexico Moves in New York,
CREDIT SLIPS (Nov. 10, 2014, 11:51 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2014/11/i
cma-cacs-v-20-mexico-moves-in-new-york.html [hereinafter Gelpern, CACs v. 2.0]; see
also Anna Gelpern, ICMA CACs, New York Edition—Vietnam!—and more UnBoilerplate, CREDIT SLIPS (Nov. 18, 2014, 11:13 AM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditsl
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SEC that reflect the proposed terms of the ICMA model clauses.114 Take
for example Mexico’s new pari passu clause:
The debt securities rank and will rank without any
preference among themselves and equally with all other
unsubordinated public external indebtedness of Mexico.
It is understood that this provision shall not be construed
so as to require Mexico to make payments under the debt
securities ratably with payments being made under any
other public external indebtedness.115
A notable feature of many of these clauses is that they no longer
include the Latin term pari passu and that they explicitly disavow the
ratable payment construction.116 Although they are modeled on the
ICMA model clauses, the new pari passu clauses seem to exclude
payment in slightly different ways.117 For example, Kazakhstan’s new
pari passu clause is phrased as follows:
The Notes will at all times rank pari passu without
preference among themselves and at least pari passu in
right of payment, with all other unsecured External
Indebtedness of the Issuer from time to time outstanding,
provided, however, that the Issuer shall have no
obligation to effect equal or rateable payment(s) at any
time with respect to the Notes or any other External
Indebtedness and, in particular, shall have no obligation
to pay other External Indebtedness at the same time or as
a condition of paying sums due on the Notes and vice
versa.118
And Vietnam’s new pari passu clause is phrased as follows:
The Notes shall at all times rank without any preference
among themselves and equally with all other present and
future unsecured and unsubordinated External
Indebtedness (subject to Condition 11 below [Negative
Pledge]) provided, however, consistent with similar
provisions in the Government’s other External
114
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Indebtedness, that this provision shall not be construed
so as to oblige the Government to effect equal or
rateable payment(s) at any time with respect to any such
other External Indebtedness and, in particular, it shall
not be construed so as to oblige the Government to pay
other External Indebtedness at the same time or as a
condition of paying sums due on the Notes and vice
versa.119
Compared to the new pari passu clauses of Kazakhstan and Vietnam,
Mexico’s new provision clearly and succinctly states the intended
purpose of the contract’s clause, therefore, ensuring that a future court
will not require payment on a ratable basis—an objective that all three
clauses aim to achieve.

III. ANALYSIS
A. Question
Professors Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati explain that boilerplate
clauses in sovereign debt contracts do not change until they receive an
“interpretive shock.”120 However, as demonstrated by the cases of Peru
and Argentina, the coordinated market response may take different
forms.121 Following Peru, the market reacted with a coordinated
litigation strategy.122 Following Argentina, the market reacted swiftly by
modifying and adopting new formations of the pari passu clause.123
After Peru, Choi and Gulati’s research revealed that boilerplate
clauses do not change “every time there was an aberrant court
decision.”124 Peru and Argentina are very similar decisions, but each case
produced a very different reaction.125 Why then did the response to the
“interpretive shock” after Peru manifest itself as a litigation strategy as
opposed to a contractual drafting strategy?
Furthermore, Choi and Gulati’s research has shown that after an
“interpretive shock,” most countries will not initially change their
boilerplate language.126 Any change will usually be preceded by a
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
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See, e.g., Gelpern, ICMA CACs, supra note 108.
Choi, supra note 17, at 1137-38.
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substantial time lag.127 It took nearly three years before Mexico altered
its UACs to reflect the meaning applied by Ecuador.128 In Peru, the
market only reacted with its litigation strategy when the contested
interpretation of the pari passu clause made an appearance in New York
courts.129 Why then did modifications to the pari passu clause appear so
rapidly following Argentina v. NML?130 Why was there no waiting period
before new contractual clauses were drafted?

B. Answer
In order to understand the reason for the speed of the market
response after Argentina, we must first understand the reason for the lack
of severity in the market response following Peru. Why was a litigation
strategy seen as a better option than modifying the boilerplate clauses?
Explanations of the coordinated market response following Peru can be
divided in to two groups—endogenous reasons and exogenous
reasons.131
Endogenous reasons look inward, to the nature of the boilerplate
contract itself.132 Boilerplate contracts are inherently “sticky” in order to
lower transaction costs to market participants.133 Change occurs when the
“interpretive shock” itself becomes too costly for market participants.134
After Peru, many market participants believed that the Belgian Court’s
decision was a one-time occurrence.135 They doubted that a New York
court would accept a similar interpretation.136 Additionally, a change to
contractual terms would be helpful for new contracts, but it would not
address the preexisting debt with doubtful pari passu language.137 The
costs involved in reworking the pari passu clause would entail the costs
of mass coordination as well as the uncertainty involved with using a
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non-standard term.138 Therefore, a coordinated litigation strategy was
seen as the most effective way to protect the interpretation of pari passu
clauses—both old and new.139
Exogenous reasons look to outside factors that, while operating
simultaneously, may mitigate the need for change.140 Around the same
time as Peru, the market saw a shift from UACs, which required
unanimous bondholder approval to make modifications to repayment
terms, to CACs, which only required a majority (or sometimes
supermajority) of bondholders to agree to modifications.141 This change
gave increased power to sovereign debtors and decreased the power of
holdout creditors.142 Thus, there was less perceived need to further
decrease the power of holdout creditors.143 Also, the 2001 Argentinean
debt default occurred shortly after the Peru decision.144 This presented
the perfect opportunity for market participants to merely continue the
litigation process.
However, Argentina differs from Peru in one key way—besides
giving a holdout investor a “weapon” to use, a holdout investor has
actually used said weapon.145 This case gave private creditors a weapon
with which they could enjoin a sovereign debtor’s repayment to any
other creditor holding debt of the same legal priority.146 This weapon was
then used by NML against Argentina when the fund forced the nation
into default.147 These cases are no longer instances of a vulture fund
waving a metaphorical gun; following Argentina, NML actually fired the
weapon.
Although the Belgian Court decision in Peru was also seen as
placing a weapon in the hands of holdout investors, the potential weapon
was never used, as the parties reached a settlement.148 Thus, the Peru
decision raised awareness to the risks associated with the pari passu
clause, but it left no major impact.149 Only after a holdout investor
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exercised its power over a sovereign nation, did the need for rapid
change become so clear.150
Now, unlike Peru, the cost of leaving the pari passu clause as is
exceeds the costs of adopting the modified clauses. The “interpretive
shock” of a court giving a private investor the means to force a sovereign
nation into default, and the investor actually exercising said power, has
become too costly for market participants.151 Furthermore, the Belgian
Court’s decision is no longer an “aberration” and a one-time
occurrence.152 The formulation of the original pari passu clause has
repeatedly been shown to be flawed, and there is no longer any reason to
try and protect contracts with those clauses.
The exogenous reasons surrounding the Peru litigation are no longer
present after Argentina. Sovereign nations are now more exposed than
ever to the power wielded by holdout investors. There is no longer any
doubt surrounding the meaning of, and the costs associated with, the
boilerplate formulation of the old pari passu clause. Therefore, there are
few risks borne by adopting the modified pari passu clause, and there is a
sudden rush for market participants to get themselves out of their
precarious situations.

C. What to Expect Next
1. Further Litigation of the Pari Passu Clause
Despite the power afforded to holdout investors in Argentina,
litigation of the pari passu clause is not complete.153 To fully appreciate
the scope of the Argentina decision, it is necessary to examine the
Second Circuit’s decision is greater detail. The pari passu clause in
Argentina’s FAA Bonds was phrased as follows:
[t]he Securities will constitute . . . direct, unconditional,
unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the
Republic and shall at all times rank pari passu without
any preference among themselves. The payment
obligations of the Republic under the Securities shall at
all times rank at least equally with all its other present
and future unsecured and unsubordinated External
Indebtedness . . . .154
150
151
152
153
154
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The Second Circuit concluded that those two sentences of the pari
passu clause created two separate obligations.155 “The first sentence . . .
prohibits Argentina, as bond issuer, from formally subordinating the
bonds by issuing superior debt.”156 In addition, “[t]he second
sentence . . . prohibits Argentina, as bond payor, from paying on other
bonds without paying on the FAA Bonds.”157
The decision of the Second Circuit adopted the “ratable payment”
interpretation introduced by the Lowenfeld affidavit in Peru.158 Still, the
court’s decision may be somewhat narrow in scope.159 The Second
Circuit merely affirmed the district court’s decision that Argentina
breached its contract with bondholders by its “course of conduct” and
“extraordinary behavior.”160 Future litigation will be needed to determine
the meaning of “course of conduct” and the “behavior” necessary to
constitute a breach of contract.161
Nevertheless, the Argentina decision was still sufficient to initiate
the rapid change seen in sovereign debt contracts. “[M]ost international
sovereign bonds issued after 2000 have pari passu clauses that include
language that is functionally similar to that in the relevant Argentine
bonds.”162 Even though future cases will likely determine the breadth of
the “course of conduct” necessary to breach the pari passu clause, “this is
the first instance in which a district court order triggered a sovereign
155
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default by barring a sovereign from paying on debt obligations . . . it was
willing and financially able to meet.”163 Now, other sovereigns have
witnessed a nation default on debt that is functionally equivalent to their
own. That default is likely the reason why the new ICMA model contract
clauses have been adopted so quickly.

2. Pari Passu as a Matter of English Law
Both Peru and Argentina dealt with the pari passu clause as a matter
of New York law.164 Yet, a large percentage of outstanding sovereign
bonds are governed subject to English law.165 Still, “[t]here is no clear
English judicial precedent on the interpretation of the pari passu
clause.”166
In 2005, the Financial Markets Law Committee (“FMLC”) published
a report, which concluded that the pari passu clause would follow the
“ranking” interpretation as a matter of English law and not the “ratable”
interpretation.167 “It is . . . strongly asserted that the [ratable] payment
interpretation of the pari passu clause is unsupportable as a matter of
English law except where the clause is very clearly drafted to achieve
this effect.”168 Following the decisions of the Second Circuit and the
Supreme Court in Argentina, the FMLC reiterated its position that
“English Courts would . . . likely take a different approach . . . and in
particular would likely regard the remedy of specific performance as
unsuitable.”169
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Should the contested interpretation of the pari passu clause appear in
English courts, the FMLC report should prove to be very persuasive by
serving a similar purpose as the Lowenfeld affidavit in Peru. “There is
almost no risk that English courts, faced with similar facts to NML v
Argentina, would adopt the ‘payment’ interpretation.”170 Still, it would
be risky for English contracting parties to continue to use the boilerplate
pari passu clauses.171 There will always be risk associated with any sort
of litigation and it is impossible to guarantee that a judge will not follow
the Argentina decision.172 Also, the process of engaging in such
litigation, alone, can prove costly and foreign market participants may
still feel exposed using the original boilerplate clauses.173
When Choi and Gulati conducted their research on boilerplate
evolution in sovereign debt contracts, they also studied the impact of an
“interpretative shock” on English-Law bonds.174 They observed that
English market participants did react to shocks in the New York market,
but that the innovation was considerably smaller than what was occurring
in New York.175 The big change that took place in New York was the
shift from UACs to CACs; but, “the English market was already using
CACs when the New York market shocks occurred.”176 Therefore, it is
not entirely clear how the English market should react when the
boilerplate clauses, that received the interpretive shock, differ very little
between English and New York law.177
Although it has been widely accepted that an English court would
not accept the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the pari passu clause in
Argentina, it would not be surprising if the English market modified its
boilerplate pari passu clauses as well. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that
new sovereign bonds will increasingly adopt English law in their choice
of law provisions instead of New York law. The new modifications to
the pari passu clause subject to New York law make explicit the
intentions of the contracting parties to adopt the “ranking” interpretation;
and therefore, the reasons for changing the governing law provisions to a
170
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more favorable jurisdiction are obviated.178 The main reason for a
foreign-law choice of law provision in a sovereign debt contract is to
prevent the issuer from changing its domestic laws in order to get out of
an unfavorable provision in the contract.179
Furthermore, there are other reasons why parties choose New York
law.180 “New York has a well-developed body of commercial law[,] . . .
its courts are considered both impartial and experienced in resolving
disputes[,] . . . and . . . many of the lenders to foreign sovereign debtors
are based in New York.”181 Therefore, sovereign bonds issued subject to
English law may change to reflect the Second Circuit’s decision in
Argentina, but it is unlikely that there will be an increase in sovereign
bonds issued subject to English law.

IV. CONCLUSION
When new boilerplate clauses are adopted in sovereign debt
contracts, smaller market participants are first to adopt the changes.182
Larger market participants will only shift when it is evident that a new
standard is clearly underway.183 Peru, Mexico, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam
have already issued new debt using ICMA’s model clauses.184 However,
unlike historical changes to boilerplate contracts, it has not been
individual countries that are innovating the new clauses.185 ICMA and
the IMF, both undoubtedly large market participants, have modified the
pari passu clauses.186
178

See IMF, supra note 19, at 15.
See Andrew Clare & Nicholas Schmidlin, Impact of Foreign Governing Law on
European Government Bond Yields, SSRN (Mar. 8, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2406477, at 9. In fact, this is what the Greek Parliament did when it
approved Law 4050/2012 on February 23, 2012, aka, the “Mopping-Up Law.” See
Melissa A. Boudreau, Restructuring Sovereign Debt Under Local Law: Are Retrofit
Collective Action Clauses Expropriatory?, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 164, 165-66 (2012).
“Instead of directly modifying contractual language, the Mopping-Up Law would change
local law to effectively incorporate a collective action clause in all untendered local-law
bonds.” Id. at 168. For these reasons, strong evidence suggests that “foreign law bonds
should trade at a premium to bonds governed by local law since they are harder to
restructure.” See Clare, supra note 179, at 32.
180
See George Weisz et al., Selected Issues in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 12 U. PA. J.
INT’L BUS. L. 1, 4 (1991).
181
Id.
182
See Choi, supra note 13, at 21.
183
Id. at 22.
184
See Gelpern, CACs v. 2.0, supra note 108; see also Gelpern, ICMA CACs, supra
note 108.
185
See Choi, supra note 13, at 21.
186
See Gelpern, supra note 35; see also IMF, supra note 19.
179

198

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:175

The Second Circuit decision in Argentina v. NML and the subsequent
debt default by Argentina is arguably the strongest “interpretive shock”
that the pari passu clause has ever received. The pari passu clause has
suddenly become a “weapon” that holdout investors are willing to use.
Unlike Peru, it would make little sense for market participants to
continue their coordinated litigation strategy. The pari passu clause has
been demonstrated to be dangerous and it presents an immediate threat to
insolvent sovereign nations. No reasons exist, either endogenous or
exogenous, to have a long waiting period until large-scale adoption of the
new pari passu clauses. Change is clearly underway, and it can be
expected to see further large-scale market adoption of the reformulated
pari passu clauses in sovereign debt contracts.

